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Health information systems and accountability in Kenya: A structuration theory 
perspective  
Abstract 
Health information systems (HIS) in most low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have 
been often implemented under the international pressure of accounting for health care 
investments. The idea behind robust and efficient HIS is that health information can allow for 
better planning and monitoring of the health service, which may translate into better health 
outcomes. Yet, the use of HIS as accountability tools has often been criticized as being 
counterproductive by making health information more meaningful to national governments 
and international agencies rather than those in charge of local health services. The objective 
of this paper is to analyse how HIS influence the emergence of local accountability practices 
and their consequences for the provision of health care. A theoretical perspective from 
structuration theory is built and integrated with the technology domain of HIS. This 
perspective is used in the analysis of a case study of HIS in Kenya. This study raises 
implications for the use of structuration theory in understanding accountability and the role of 
IT materiality in processes of structuration. It contributes to a better understanding of how 
HIS can foster improved health care and human development. It also contributes to the 
understanding of IS not just as means for governing people’s behaviour but also as means 
of socialization through which users can negotiate multiple accountability goals.  
Keywords: health information systems, information technology, accountability, health care, 
Africa, structuration theory 
Introduction 
Accountability and good governance are often at the centre of development programmes 
(Bangura & Larbi, 2006; Djelic & Sahlin, 2006) in order to fight corruption, mismanagement, 
and inefficient bureaucracies (Drori, 2006; Hood, 2000; Lynn, 2006). The argument of most 
development programmes is that the social and economic development of a country is more 
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likely to be achieved if policy-makers and civil servants are held accountable for their actions 
(Ciborra, 2005; Ciborra & Navarra, 2005).  
In the health sector, assumptions about the benefits of accountability have driven the 
implementation of health information systems (HIS). The idea behind HIS is that health 
information can allow for better planning and monitoring of the health services, which may 
translate into better health outcomes. Yet, the literature on HIS in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) has been quite critical about the counterproductive effect of the 
strengthening of HIS as a means to achieve accountability (Madon, Krishna, & Michael, 
2010). Donor agencies and governments would mostly use HIS to monitor health 
programmes and how money invested in health care is spent. According to both academics 
and practitioners, accountability results in the fragmentation of HIS, causing little use of 
information to improve health care services at the point of delivery (Sahay, Saebo, 
Mekonnen, & Gizaw, 2010; Smith, Madon, Anifalaje, Lazarro-Malecela, & Michael, 2008).  
Recent research has mainly considered accountability as a managerialist concept 
translated into LMICs from Western nations through international policy reforms and 
imported information systems. As a result, local actors struggle to fully understand and 
internalize accountability (Ciborra & Navarra, 2005). In the health sector specifically, the 
main motivation for accounting for results is to gain legitimacy for further funding or to avoid 
sanctions. The main problem with this attitude is that the gap between HIS outputs (e.g., 
number of patients admitted to hospitals) and ideal performance outputs (e.g., improved 
health service utilization) widens (Noir & Walsham, 2007). Knowing about the number of 
patients that use the health service is not necessarily followed by the right action to improve 
health service utilization. Narrowing the gap between HIS outputs and ideal outputs requires 
a greater understanding of the value of health information in accounting for results and 
improving decision making in the health service. A more productive use of health information 
depends on how local HIS users legitimize accountability in their day-to-day work. 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to provide a greater understanding of how HIS 
influence the enactment of accountability and with what implications for a better use of 
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information in health service delivery. In particular, the paper will seek to answer the 
following questions: i. how does accountability acquire legitimacy and become enacted 
locally? ii. how do the capabilities of HIS mediate the enactment of accountability? 
 The author conducted an interpretive study about HIS in Kenya. Based on the 
insights gained from the findings, the paper delivers the following contributions. First, the 
paper integrates the notion of materiality in structuration theory. In this way, it considerably 
sharpens the theoretical perspective of structuration theory for a better understanding of how 
IT relates to the socio-organizational context. More specifically, the paper adopts 
structuration theory as a sensitizing lens to understand the recursive relationship between 
social structures and agency and its implications for the reproduction of accountability. 
Acknowledging the limitations of structuration theory in understanding material agency 
(Jones, 1999; Jones & Karsten, 2008; Silva, 2007), this paper builds on Sewell’s (1992) 
work on structuration theory and adopts the notion of “interpretive flexibility” to account for 
the material features of HIS in processes of structuration. The framework is used in the 
analysis of findings. 
Second, it increases the understanding of how HIS can foster development by taking 
a human development perspective that considers health care and access to information 
fundamental human rights (Andrade & Urquhart, 2009; Silva & Westrup, 2009; Zheng, 
2009). Traditionally, a neoliberal logic has influenced the use of ICT for development and in 
the provision of health care (Madon, 2009; Navarra & Cornford, 2009; Schuppan, 2009). 
Under this logic HIS are used to monitor the economic return of health care interventions 
and promote an efficient use of resources. By taking a human development perspective, this 
paper shifts the attention from the funders to the recipients of health care and seeks to 
understand how health care managers can use HIS to address the needs of their 
communities.  
Finally, this paper contributes to further our understanding of how information 
systems mediate the enactment of accountability. Most IS research focuses on 
accountability as a means for controlling behaviour (Constantinides, 2011; Doolin, 2003; 
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Vieira da Cunha, Carugati, & Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2015). This study takes a sociological 
perspective on accountability (Roberts, 1991) and unveils how IS mediate the socializing 
effects of accountability. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next two sections review the literatures on IS 
and accountability and the role of HIS in enforcing accountability. Next, an examination of 
the theoretical framework is provided followed by an illustration of the research method, the 
case study description and analysis. The paper closes with a discussion of findings followed 
by implications and conclusions.  
Information systems and accountability 
Accountability is “a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct to some significant other” (Bovens, 2005, p. 184). Information 
systems are often used as means of control and surveillance to hold people accountable for 
their actions, for example, through the monitoring of quantitative measures of processes and 
outcomes (Constantinides, 2011; Doolin, 1998). The use of information systems in 
monitoring performance has been criticized for providing false representations of work, 
mainly because of management’s pressure to comply with targets that are often 
unachievable. This often results in poor quality of information which can mislead decision 
makers (Vieira da Cunha et al., 2015). Similar problems have affected HIS in LMICs where 
health workers have been found to misreport data in order to escape reprimand for missing 
targets (Kimaro & Sahay, 2007; Noir & Walsham, 2007). 
Thus, accuracy of information used in decision making is not only dependent on 
system quality, as is suggested in other studies (Li, Peters, Richardson, & Watson, 2012), 
but is also related to behavioural norms regulating the use of IS to account for results. 
Norms legitimizing accountability are not always resisted. Recent research has documented 
the role of IS in making actors’ actions more visible and, therefore, accountable to the work 
of their team or organization members (Constantinides, 2011; Doolin, 2003). Actors thus 
become self-disciplined subjects and more aware of the consequences of their actions and 
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less likely to repeat mistakes (Doolin, 1998). By interacting with an information system, 
users internalize norms of behaviour inscribed in its design. An example of such norms 
could be the “efficient use of clinical resources” by medical staff in a hospital. By mediating 
discourses and meanings that characterize everyday life in an organization, information 
systems contribute to the internalization of norms holding people accountable for their 
behaviour (Doolin, 1998).  
Even though recent research has acknowledged the role of IS in mediating meanings 
and behaviours of accountability, it still privileges an individualizing form of accountability 
(Roberts, 1991) whereby IS reinforce norms of control by making our behaviours more 
visible to the “invisible power” of management. Thus, IS mediates objective representations 
of our performance through which we seek to stand out and isolate ourselves from our peers 
(Roberts, 1991). In contrast, a socializing form of accountability is enacted through dialogue 
and individuals learning from each other’s experience. Dialogue is more likely to occur and 
produce socializing effects when there are no power differences among individuals (Roberts, 
2001). For example, in a study about primary care by Madon & Krishna (2017), actors 
understand the importance of accounting for expenditure and resources through social 
learning and knowledge sharing. The IS literature has overlooked such a socializing form of 
accountability, which can be particularly useful in understanding how IS can contribute to 
making decentralized work accountable not just through control (Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, & 
Van Reenen, 2014) but also through social interactions and learning.  
Bureaucratic and democratic accountabilities in the context of HIS 
The literature distinguishes different forms of accountability. In relation to IS in the health 
sector specifically, it is possible to recognise hierarchical or bureaucratic forms of 
accountability (Lupson & Partington, 2011; Yang, 2012), through which funding and 
regulatory bodies expect IT systems to work as monitoring tools with a view to minimising 
error in clinical practice (Bloomfield & McLean, 2003; Davidson & Chismar, 2007; Doolin, 
2004; Jensen, Kjærgaard, & Svejvig, 2009) and improving the distribution and allocation of 
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resources (Madon et al., 2010; Noir & Walsham, 2007). In return, by using IS to be more 
accountable, health professionals and managers gain legitimacy to qualify for further 
funding. 
“Bureaucratic accountability for performance” (Lupson & Partington, 2011, p. 912), is 
a form of “upward” accountability (Baur & Schmitz, 2012) that controls for performance and 
limits the action of individuals. For example, there can be tensions between funders’ 
expectations of budgetary limitations to professional action and the “autonomous exercise of 
professional judgment” expected by clinical professional bodies (Freeman, McWilliam, 
MacKinnon, DeLuca, & Rappolt, 2009). Another major downside of bureaucratic 
accountability is that it “reduces accountability to mere financial accounting without fully 
involving those affected by their activities” (Baur & Schmitz, 2012, p. 14). In this way, the 
day-by-day added value of local practices becomes invisible behind macro-numerical 
representations (Keevers, Treleaven, Sykes, & Darcy, 2012). In the health context, the use 
of IS to account for results at the national level undermines efforts to be more accountable to 
beneficiaries, in particular, health care providers and patients. 
The debate over bureaucratic accountability is particularly heated in the context of 
international aid in LMICs. On the one hand, powerful stakeholders such as donor agencies 
and national governments exercise a lot of pressure to ensure financial and performance 
accountability (Mekonnen & Sahay, 2008; Piotti, Chilundo, & Sahay, 2006; Smith et al., 
2008). On the other hand, health care professionals are often affected by the limitations of 
bureaucratic accountability. They often contest the use of HIS to monitor their performance 
claiming that they serve more the needs of funding bodies, government bureaucrats, and 
health managers rather than the needs of health professionals and their patients (Madon et 
al., 2010). Thus, health workers in charge of collecting data often prioritise the care of 
patients over data reporting, which reduces the effectiveness of HIS in performance 
monitoring (Chilundo & Aanestad, 2004; Piotti et al., 2006).  
Hence, available studies suggest that bureaucratic accountability has increased the 
legitimacy of HIS as monitoring tools rewarding national governments with funding. Yet, it 
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has decreased the legitimacy of HIS among its main users such as health workers, and, 
therefore, reduced the effectiveness of HIS in addressing the needs of local communities.  
The controversial effects of bureaucratic accountability have raised the need to 
revisit the role of HIS in favour of “democratic” accountability (Madon et al., 2010). 
“Democratic” accountability is a political and socializing form of accountability (Lupson & 
Partington, 2011; Mulgan, 2000; Pina, Torres, & Acerete, 2007; Roberts, 1996). It requires 
public service workers to interact with each other and engage with the public to cater for 
citizens’ needs and concerns (Brinkerhoff, 2004; Madon & Krishna, 2017).  
According to previous research, devolution and a decentralised HIS are two of the 
main factors that can enable “democratic” or “downward” accountability in the health sector 
(Madon et al., 2010). With devolution, local health authorities are granted more autonomy in 
the use of local resources to meet the needs of their communities. A decentralised HIS can 
equip local authorities with the necessary tools to capture and analyse data locally. Yet, 
there does not seem to be any empirical study that shows how a decentralised HIS, 
matched with devolution, leads to a more democratic form of accountability which enables a 
productive use of information in health service management. The case study analysed in this 
paper demonstrates how centralized and decentralized practices of accountability may 
coexist, adding to the complexity of the impact of HIS on health service planning and 
management.  
Structuration theory  
Scholars in the IS field have used Giddens’s structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984) 
mainly to understand how users’ interactions with IT evolve, what the organizational 
implications of these interactions are, and how we can try to deal with their intended and 
unintended consequences (Barley, 1986; Jones & Karsten, 2008; Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 
2005). Researchers have also used structuration theory to understand processes of stability 
and change of social practices in relation to ICTs in cross-cultural global/local settings 
(Sarker & Sahay, 2003; Schultze & Orlikowski, 2004; Walsham, 2002). 
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One of the major tenets of structuration theory adopted in IS research is the notion of 
“duality of structure”, whereby structure is both the medium and outcome of human 
interaction (Giddens, 1979, 1984). Structures are the “rules and resources, recursively 
implicated in the reproduction of social systems” (Giddens, 1984, p. 377). Structures have 
only a “virtual existence” that becomes instantiated in action. They are the principles that 
pattern human practices and exist only as recursive enactments (Giddens, 1984). On the 
one hand, social structures condition agency. On the other hand, actors reflexively monitor 
their actions, and have the capability to “make a difference” or produce an effect (Giddens, 
1984, p. 15) by mobilizing existing stocks of resources, norms, and knowledge (“modalities”, 
i.e., the linkages between social structures and agency) that transform, respectively, 
structures of domination, legitimation, and signification. In this sense, structures are both 
constraining and enabling. Reflexive monitoring implies the knowledgeability of actors who 
“know a great deal about the conditions and consequences of what they do in their day-to-
day lives” (Giddens, 1984, p. 281). It also reflects the purposive character of human agency 
whereby actors always know the intentions of their actions. 
This study builds on previous work on structuration theory that views technology as 
embodying norms and rules that human actors recursively enact through their actions 
(Orlikowski, 1992; Walsham, 2002). In so doing, actors may reinforce or change social 
structures while they reproduce or reinvent the technology’s structural properties. In other 
words, “IS are drawn on to provide meaning, to exercise power, and to legitimize actions” 
(Walsham, 2002, p. 362). Yet, the view of social structures enduring within the materiality of 
technology has been criticized for being incompatible with the virtual character of Giddens’s 
structures (Jones & Karsten, 2008). Because this study seeks to understand how HIS 
capabilities mediate the enactment of accountability, it is important to account for the role of 
IT materiality in the explanation of this social phenomenon.  
One perspective that seeks to understand how IT materiality is constitutive of social 
practices is sociomateriality. There are two ontological positions of sociomateriality (Cecez-
Kecmanovic, Galliers, Henfridsson, Newell, & Vidgen, 2014). The first one is based on 
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Barad’s “agential realism” and considers the material and the social as intricately related. 
What is social is also material, and vice versa and the two become constitutively entangled 
to generate “sociomaterial practices” (Orlikowski, 2007). The second one builds on critical 
realism to consider the material and the social as two discrete entities that constitute each 
other through their interaction (Leonardi, 2013; Mutch, 2013). Yet, neither of these 
perspectives of sociomateriality can be used to account for the recursive instantiation of 
social structures in action and reflexivity as structuration theory does. Actors do not only 
reflexively monitor their actions and the actions of others, but they also expect their actions 
to be monitored (Giddens, 1984). Through reflexive monitoring actors constantly seek 
justification for their actions in accordance with “what is normal and expected” (Giddens, 
1984, p. 30). Structures of domination, legitimation and signification hold actors accountable 
by ensuring that their behaviour is socially acceptable. For these reasons, structuration 
theory is a good foundation for this study, and therefore a way to integrate materiality within 
structuration theory is needed.  
In order to overcome the undertheorization of materiality within structuration theory, 
Sewell (1992) proposes that “allocative resources” being non-human and therefore material 
– and which Giddens acknowledges to be implicated in the reproduction of social structures 
– are “actual” rather than “virtual”. Based on this new definition of resources, structures 
retain their virtual quality in the form of rules and norms, while resources are the outcomes 
and means of structures. It is only by accessing resources that agents can enact rules and 
norms. For example, from the material resources of a factory, such as the design of its 
assembly line, one can infer the rules that govern work in a capitalist society (Sewell, 2005).  
Sewell’s reconceptualization of “allocative resources” is a first step towards 
acknowledging that the structural properties of IT, which are material and, therefore, non-
virtual, can be implicated in processes of structuration. Similar to the factory in Sewell’s 
example, a technology has material features that constitute the meanings users associate 
with it and, therefore, influence how users use the technology (Doherty, Coombs, & Loan-
Clarke, 2006). Thus, the materiality of technology has an impact on society by contributing to 
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shaping users’ intentions to use it in a certain way. In particular, the degree to which a 
technology shapes the social structures, such as norms, rules, and meanings emerging from 
its enactments, is defined by its “interpretive flexibility” (Bijker, 1987; Orlikowski, 1992, 
2000). Interpretive flexibility is the extent to which the material features of an IT “might limit 
its ability to be interpreted flexibly” (Doherty et al., 2006, p. 569), which, as a result, limits the 
ways IT can be used and have an impact on society. Thus, interpretive flexibility determines 
the extent to which users can draw on the norms and values of their surrounding institutional 
context to interpret a technology (Orlikowski, 1992). On the one hand, the material features 
of an IT constitute the meanings that are recursively implicated in its use and the 
consequent reproduction of social structures. On the other hand, the social domain, 
comprising norms, rules and other resources, influence how users interpret and use an IT 
within the boundaries of its material features.  
In summary, building on Sewell’s conceptualization of the materiality of allocative 
resources within structuration theory, this study adopts the notion of “interpretive flexibility” to 
better account for the materiality of technology in processes of structuration. Under this 
perspective, the material features of HIS define the rules and norms implicated in the 
reproduction of social practices that perform accountability. While actors reflexively monitor 
their situation and actions, the interpretive flexibility of the HIS marks the boundaries within 
which the technology domain (i.e., the material features of a technology) and the social 
domain (i.e., power relations, norms and meaning systems of a social context) mutually 
interact and shape users’ interpretations of the HIS. Users’ interpretations will then influence 
how the HIS is implicated in the reproduction of structures (domination, legitimation, 
signification) and the consequent enactment of accountability either through means of 
control (bureaucratic accountability) or through socialization and the sharing of knowledge, 
norms and values (democratic accountability). Figure 1 illustrates the structurational 
perspective adopted in the analysis of the case study of HIS in Kenya.  
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Figure 1. A structuration theory model of IS-mediated accountability  
Research method 
Data collection 
The research is based on a case study of the Ministry of Health’s information systems in 
Kenya. Data were collected from interviews and documents between 2007 and 2015. 
Between 2007 and 2008, a sample of thirty-eight semi-structured interviews was collected, 
together with four unstructured interviews held with four senior officials of the Government of 
Kenya. Informants from the Ministry of Health and the Government of Kenya were selected 
based on the relevance of their role in relation to health sector reforms and the restructuring 
of health information systems, and, whenever possible, based on the earliest date of 
deployment, given the importance of gathering historical accounts. 
In the Ministry of Health, the sample of informants included different organizational 
roles, such as HIS officers, medical officers occupying a managerial role, and senior 
government officers. This was part of a “comprehensive sampling” strategy (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 38) in order to have a more systemic view of the evolution of the 
Social domain 
(Power, norms, 
meaning systems) 
Mutual shaping 
relationship 
Structures of domination, 
legitimation, signification 
Actors’ reflexivity may lead to 
action that triggers change in 
Technology and Social Domains 
Democratic 
accountability enacted 
through socialization 
 
Bureaucratic 
accountability enacted 
through mechanisms 
of control 
 
Technology domain  
(HIS material 
features) 
 12 
information systems and gather diversified perceptions of institutional and technological 
changes and their implications for working practices and management structures.  
In 2011, six informants from international donor agencies were also interviewed over 
the phone in order to gain the perspective of the main international actors involved in the 
implementation of health sector reforms and HIS in Kenya. In 2015, eight phone interviews 
were conducted with the users of a new decentralised HIS, DHIS2. The total number of 
interviews collected is fifty-six as shown in Table 1. 
Participants 2007 2008 2011 2015 Totals 
Two multilateral donor agencies   3  3 
Three bilateral donor agencies   3  3 
Senior Government Officers 1 3   4 
HIS Officers  19  7 26 
IT officers  3   3 
Medical officers  16  1 17 
Total 
1 41 6 8 56 
Table 1. Overview of interviews 
Primary data from interviews were integrated with a sample of approximately 6,000 
pages of documents taken from the archives of the Ministry of Health. These included 
government policy documents, minutes of meetings, letters and HIS reports covering a 
period from 1977 to 2008. Relevant international agencies’ policy and project documents 
available from the Internet were also collected. With respect to interviews, documents were 
a valuable historical source of information for tracing past events and practices that the 
memory of informants could not recall.  
Data analysis 
Interviews and relevant documentary extracts were transcribed and coded. Based on the 
key ideas of an inductive methodology (Birks, Fernandez, Levina, & Nasirin, 2013; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Sarker, Lau, & Sahay, 2000; Urquhart, Lehmann, & Myers, 2010), the 
structuration theory framework represented in Figure 1 was used as a guide and coding was 
conducted by remaining open to emergent phenomena (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). 
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Through “open coding”, codes were constructed inductively by identifying concepts inferred 
from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Orlikowski, 1993; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
Finally, “axial coding” was used in order to organize codes under a more 
comprehensive scheme of recurring themes or common categories (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Second-order codes included themes such as power (representing availability and 
mobilisation of resources), norms, meaning systems, technology features, and structures of 
domination, legitimation and signification. Relevant data were then analysed based on an 
interpretive approach. Interpretive research acquires knowledge of reality by analysing 
meanings that people assign to events, speeches, documents and artefacts (Klein & Myers, 
1999). It is useful in understanding both the context in which information systems are 
situated and the processes through which information systems influence and are influenced 
by context (Walsham, 1993, 2006). Under this perspective, it is thus possible to unravel the 
complex interaction between multiple actors, context, and technology. The interpretation of 
data coded was used to piece together a narrative of events telling the story of how 
accountability gained legitimacy. A summary of the coding scheme is available in the 
Appendix. 
Case study 
Until 2010, the health information system in Kenya was mainly paper-based. Data were 
collected at health facilities that would then send data reports to the district level. Districts 
would aggregate these data on summary forms and send them to the national level. 
International donor organizations were funding ad-hoc information systems within 
specialized programmes such as Immunization and HIV/AIDS to control how their money 
was spent. Thus, they increased the workload of health staff in charge of collecting data 
(HIS, 1980). 
The end of President Arap Moi’s undemocratic and corrupted regime after the 
General Elections of 2002 boosted donors’ confidence and spending in Kenya. Higher donor 
contributions to the country’s health sector increased donors’ demand for health information 
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to account for results. Regardless of a new policy to integrate health information systems 
under the Division of HMIS (Health Management Information Systems) in the Ministry of 
Health (Ministry of Health, 1997, p. 43), donor organizations intensified their support to 
health programmes’ information systems. As a result, districts were just reporting data to the 
national level without seeing the value of the information collected. In order to improve the 
use of health information at district level, in 2010, the Ministry of Health started the 
implementation of a new decentralized information system, DHIS2 (District Health 
Information System). DHIS2 was rolled out to all 47 county governments created after the 
devolution reform of 2010.  
Against the backdrop of these events, the case study that follows analyses the 
processes through which HIS users enacted accountability in the National Programme of 
Immunization. The focus then shifts to the enactment of accountability following the 
implementation of DHIS2 in 2010. Because the system is used across all levels of the 
Ministry of Health, this part of the case study narrates the experience of HIS users both at 
county and national level. Users at the national level include HIS officers at the Division of 
HMIS and other national health programmes.   
The information system of the Programme of Immunization  
Towards the end of the 1990s the WHO recommended that all countries set up efficient 
information systems for disease surveillance and routine immunization monitoring 
(WHO/Africa, 1992). Thus, information became a key asset for the planning of activities of 
the Programme of Immunization in Kenya. In this regard, one of their plans of action 
stressed the importance of data “in guiding decisions” (KEPI, 1996a, p. 1). 
Most officers working in the Programme in the 1990s confirmed that after the start of 
donor-funded polio campaigns, they experienced an increase in the demand for information 
to plan for immunization and disease surveillance activities. The vaccines manager said that 
they wanted to improve the quality of their service through better monitoring of their 
performance and supplies:   
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“We wanted to improve quality of service giving kids potent vaccines […]. We also used to 
have a lot of wastages… so we wanted to be more accountable with the supplies that we 
were using, especially the vaccines and also… the syringes and needles”. 
Yet, in one meeting it was noted that the reporting rates from the districts were very 
low and that the Programme’s management was not using information (KEPI, 1996b). An 
HIS officer for the Programme stressed how he and other HIS officers tried to improve the 
performance of the information system in order to convince their managers of the value of 
information for the monitoring and planning of the Programme’s activities: 
“Over time we have been able to improve on the timeliness and [completeness] of data from 
the districts. This helped the managers and the users of these data to really accept what we 
have been doing”. 
In particular, the Programme intensified supervision at the districts in order to exhort 
them to send data reports to the national level as suggested in this quote by a HIS officer: 
“There was a quarterly meeting where every district could be put on the screen, these are 
your reports this is how you are performing let us know what’s happening”. 
The Programme received little funding from the Ministry of Health and, for the most 
part, was dependent on donor funding. Therefore, when donor agencies cut their 
contributions to immunization to focus on other health priorities (e.g., HIV/AIDS) (KEPI, 
2001), the Programme was struggling to supply districts with resources essential for the 
functioning of the information system, such as data reporting forms (KEPI, 1998). 
In 2001, donor funding for immunization was revived thanks to the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). GAVI released funding to Kenya through a 
“performance-based grant programme” (GAVI, 2007), which contributed to the strengthening 
of the monitoring and evaluation system through a Data Quality Audit (DQA) (GAVI, 2004). A 
HIS officer described the new funding scheme as: 
“A reward system whereby districts get slightly more funds if they report more children so 
that they can reach many others. It makes sure that every child that is immunized is 
reported; if they [don’t], they would have problems with funds”.  
Various HIS officers said that donor agencies, such as WHO, UNICEF, and GAVI, 
were the major consumers of immunization data. In an interview, the Programme manager 
confirmed that GAVI joined other donor partners as the main drivers of the Programme’s 
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activities and its information system. She added that the start of GAVI’s DQA put more 
pressure on the Programme to strengthen their information system: 
“GAVI put on an auditing reward system in 2004 as there was a shame in the country that 
data management was not good enough and this incentive was a driver for us to improve 
our data management”. 
In order to improve data management and the timeliness of data from the field, the 
Programme Manager led the introduction of standard operating procedures (SOPs), which 
shifted data entry duties from 78 districts to 8 provinces in the country. The reduction of 
workload from 78 to 8 reports, she said, cut delays in reporting. One year later, in 2004, the 
provinces started using a new system, EPI-Info, to enter data received from the districts into 
a computer and send them to the Programme’s data management unit.  
Following these changes, one programme officer suggested that, by 2008, the usage 
of information for the planning and management of the Programme’s activities had become 
a consolidated practice. Another officer recognized the importance of the programme 
manager who involved HIS officers in the planning of the Programme’s activities: 
“The head brings us together and during the planning she allows each person professionally 
to express your skills within your area of adjudication”. 
One medical officer and qualified epidemiologist, member of the programme 
management team, stressed the importance of data to make decisions: 
“We have to decide […] when there is a threat of a disease […] or, as a vaccination 
programme, we also want to know how many children we are able to reach. [....] Data 
management informs our decision in many ways”. 
After the Division of HMIS took charge of health sector monitoring (HMIS, 2005), all 
health programmes were required to integrate their information systems (HIS, 2000). Yet, 
like other health programmes, the Programme of Immunization was reluctant to integrate its 
data management system with the Division of HMIS because it relied on data from the 
districts to account for donor funding. Thus, there were conflicts over who should manage 
the data as reported in an official document from the Ministry of Health: 
“The District Public Health Nurse preferred to do his own data management of 
[immunization] data and therefore pressured the supervisory team to set up the HMIS 
software separately on his computer. He cited the lack of confidence in the [district HIS 
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officer] as the main reason. Thus, data is now being managed separately” (Ministry of 
Health, 2006). 
The HIS after the implementation of DHIS2 and devolution 
Because the Division of HMIS and national health programmes were the main users of 
health data, health workers and managers on the field did not fully appreciate the value of 
health information for their work. Thus, in 2010, with the technical assistance of the 
University of Oslo, the Ministry and its donor partners supported the implementation of a 
District Health Information System (DHIS2) with the expectation that it would increase the 
use of information in health services management at the local level (Karuri, Waiganjo, Orwa, 
& Manya, 2014). DHIS2 is a cloud data management application for the collection and 
analysis of health data. Given the limited internet connectivity, the system is equipped with a 
local datamart for offline data entry. Data can be stored on a central server when online 
(Manya, Braa, Øverland, Titlestad, & Mumo, 2013).  
After devolution in 2010, the Government created 47 counties that replaced the 
districts and provinces. Each county government was responsible for supporting DHIS2 in 
their own area and had full autonomy in using health data to manage their own services. 
Data collected at health facilities were entered into DHIS2 at sub-county and county levels 
and made accessible to all HIS users in the country.  
Some participants argued that certain counties were still behind in the use of data. 
Others suggested that those counties with the means to support DHIS2 and make it function 
were using data more actively. Some HIS officers seemed to value the role of health 
information in health service management more than others, as suggested in this interview 
with a county HIS officer: 
“I have a passion for my profession [compared to others whose] mindset is about earning a 
salary […]. Some people do not care about monitoring information, but what I care is the use 
of information, the impact it has”. 
Some HIS officers recalled how hard it was to be involved in health management 
teams before devolution. By contrast, after devolution the impact of DHIS2 and the use of 
health information were more evident in those counties where HIS officers and health 
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management teams were working hand-in-hand, as suggested in this quote by a national 
HIS officer:  
“There are counties where our [HIS] officers are doing very well […] in guiding the whole 
staff [on] how to use indicators and [ensuring] that [anyone] in the county [knows that] 
indicators are part of everyday life”. 
A medical officer in charge of health informatics at the national level said that, DHIS2 
got medical officers and other users more interested in health data not only by giving 
unlimited data access, but also by improving data consistency: 
“DHIS helped to use the data at the point of collection. […] It worked well, it was easy, 
people started to be interested in the data… [Consistency has improved]. Even if the data is 
poor quality, it is all the same… Data improve confidence in the things we say”. 
The growing interest in DHIS2 was also demonstrated by available statistical 
evidence which indicated that, as at September 2013, data entries into the system had 
increased from 880,600 to 1,254,993 in the previous 30 days (Karuri et al., 2014). Most 
county HIS officers confirmed that their managers were using data in health service 
management. 
HIS officers at the Division of HMIS and other national health programmes were able 
to customize their reporting forms into DHIS2. County and sub-county HIS officers would 
then use DHIS2 to key in data directly into the reporting forms. National HIS officers could 
access these data directly on the national server and use the pivot tables of DHIS2 to 
analyse and use the data in order to comply with their obligation to report to the Ministry of 
Health and international donor agencies. Thus, they had to make sure that data entered into 
DHIS2 met certain quality standards: 
“We have to report both at the national and international level […]. We need to […] [provide] 
[data quality] guidelines [to the counties]”. 
Counties were under pressure to provide the national level with the information 
needed to account for the distribution of resources in the health service: 
“Counties increased information use because, at the national level, there is demand for 
evidence. The national level wants to see in the DHIS whether malaria has been reported 
and from which facility”. 
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A national HIS officer working for the Division of HMIS stated that some county 
administrators did not fully appreciate the value of indicators in health sector planning: 
“Politicians do not understand [the] meaning of indicators. […] It is an issue of accountability: 
how do you account for that money spent? […] They get a block of money […] but they do 
not know whether it is for preventive or curative services. […] For example, now we have a 
problem of cholera; […] because […] politicians […] did not take time to plan, they were 
given inadequate budget to [prevent the epidemics]”. 
Other counties questioned the value of the information that they were asked to 
collect, as reported by a medical officer at the Ministry: 
“Some of the counties would question why they are collecting so many indicators […]. Some 
of the donors work just in some areas […] Counties who do not have malaria at all, [they 
have to report] national indicators [of malaria]”. 
Table 2 summarizes findings of the case study. A structurational analysis of these 
findings is provided in the next section. 
 Programme of Immunization DHIS2 
Key events WHO recommends set up of efficient IS 
(1990s). 
GAVI performance-based grant 
programme (2001). 
Adoption of DHIS2 and decentralization 
of HIS (2010). 
Devolution and the creation of 47 
counties (2010). 
Main actors Programme/HIS officers 
Programme manager 
County HIS officers 
County administrators 
National HIS officers 
Actions Before GAVI, HIS officers seek to 
improve data reporting to convince 
management of the value of information. 
After GAVI the programme manager 
feels the pressure to strengthen the IS. 
Counties with more resources use data 
to manage their services. 
Counties question the value of the 
national indicators they have to report. 
Outcomes Epi-Info software and SOPs are 
implemented. 
Consolidated use of information for 
planning and managing Programme’s 
activities. 
Some county administrators do not use 
information for planning. 
Table 2. Summary of findings 
Structurational analysis 
This section provides a structurational analysis of the case study illustrated above. The 
focus is on accountability practices and how they emerged and evolved from the interplay 
between the technology and social domain of the HIS. The theoretical framework used in the 
analysis comprises: agency (users’ actions), social domain (power, norms, and meanings), 
technology domain (the material features of the HIS), and the structures (domination, 
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legitimation, and signification) that underpin the enactment of accountability.  
Bureaucratic accountability: The case of the Programme of Immunization  
After the WHO recommended the strengthening of routine immunization information systems 
and diseases surveillance, the assumption that data were important in guiding decisions 
became one of the key drivers of the activities of the Programme of Immunization. Increased 
demand for information to plan for immunization campaigns and disease surveillance 
triggered the reflexivity of programme officers, who, as the vaccines manager explained, 
realized the need to strengthen their monitoring systems in order to account for medical 
supplies. The fact that some programme officers recognized the need to be more 
accountable reflects that accountability had been internalized in their practices.  
In particular, HIS officers vowed to improve the performance of their information 
system to demonstrate how data could be used to monitor their programme’s activities and 
convince their managers of the value of information. This is an example of structures of 
signification that support a socializing form of accountability (Roberts, 1991) where the use 
of HIS to monitor performance mediates the constitution of social relations between HIS 
officers and their managers. Such social relations can, potentially, support the local 
enactment of accountability. In addition, HIS officers were keen to improve data reporting on 
their programme’s outcomes and activities to make their managers accept “what they had 
been doing”. This finding exemplifies how the interests of a social group can mediate the 
social construction of accountability objectives (Anifalaje, 2012; Topp, Chipukuma, & 
Hanefeld, 2015). 
Most of all, poor funding from the Ministry of Health and management’s lack of 
legitimacy of health information underscore the weak response from local institutions to 
implement the goals of international organizations, such as the WHO that drove the set up of 
information systems for immunization. The result was the lack of institutional support to 
internationally-driven HIS at the local level, which highlights the tension between formal 
governance, i.e., what is written in policy documents, and informal governance, i.e., how 
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policy goals are translated (or are not translated) into action (Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2014). In 
this case, the Ministry did not support immunization, which amplified the individualizing 
effects of bureaucratic accountability.   
More specifically, lack of support enhanced the reflexivity of HIS officers who 
engaged in a series of activities meant to exhort districts to improve the timeliness and 
completeness of data reports. One of these activities was to provide feedback to districts 
about their reporting rates in order to strengthen manual reporting systems. The power 
differential between HIS officers and districts was an obstacle to the construction and 
sharing of common accountability objectives through socialization (Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 
2014; Lodenstein, Dieleman, Gerretsen, & Broerse, 2017). Indeed, HIS officers engaged 
with the districts merely to impose the enactment of bureaucratic accountability. The result is 
that these actors used the HIS to enact just one mechanism of accountability, “answerability” 
(Topp et al., 2015) but neglected enforcement mechanisms (Brinkerhoff, 2004; Topp et al., 
2015). Whereas answerability involves the provision of information about one’s performance, 
enforcement mechanisms sanction health authorities and providers for not meeting 
performance expectations.  
An example of an enforcement mechanism is the performance-based grant that 
GAVI started in 2001. This new scheme of funding represented a source of power that 
legitimized donor support for the Programme’s information system. It also set in place new 
structures of domination and legitimation by tying funding to performance. Under this new 
funding regime, showing results was a norm that districts had to follow in order to get 
funding. In this example, management does not exercise its “invisible” power (Roberts, 
1991) only through resource allocations but also through the mediation of rules and norms. 
In this way, structures of domination are interlinked with structures of legitimation, which are 
instantiated through the normative sanctioning of social practices (Giddens, 1984). 
Acknowledging that the immunization information system was underperforming, the 
pressure to qualify for funding prompted the reflexivity of the Programme’s manager who set 
in place a series of actions meant to improve data management. As a result, the Epi-Info 
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software and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were implemented at the provinces in 
order to improve the timeliness and, possibly, the accuracy of data reports. Arguably, SOPs 
were a means the programme manager could use to control data reporting from the field. 
The programme manager’s engagement in the strengthening of the immunization 
information system shows that management had started to value information in decision 
making and had finally internalized accountability in its practices. The reinforcement of 
structures of signification in support of accountability is also demonstrated by socializing 
activities such as management’s involvement of HIS officers in the discussion of 
accountability objectives and the belief that data should inform management’s decisions as 
stated by a member of the management team. Here, socialization is meant to strengthen a 
centralized reporting of data to monitor performance, which is part of bureaucratic 
accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2004; Topp et al., 2015). By contrast, the shift of donor funding to 
other health priorities and the Programme’s reluctance to collaborate with the Division of 
HMIS on the integration of HIS demonstrate how competition over scarce resources can 
inhibit socializing forms of accountability (Lodenstein et al., 2017). The result is that the 
achievement of accountability goals such as monitoring and improving health sector 
performance cannot be achieved. Tensions over the control of information were due to 
conflicting priorities of donor agencies who contradicted internationally driven reforms by 
sponsoring the information systems of multiple health programmes, and by so doing, 
amplified the individualizing effects of bureaucratic accountability (Roberts, 1991). Figure 2 
summarizes the processes of structuration analysed above. 
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Figure 2. The enactment of bureaucratic accountability at the Programme of Immunization 
HIS decentralisation and democratic accountability: the case of DHIS2 
The poor legitimacy of health information at the lower levels of the health system was one of 
the main reasons driving the implementation of the new decentralized information system, 
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Figure 2b. Programme managers internalize bureaucratic accountability  
Social domain 
Meaning systems: data 
are important in guiding 
decisions 
Mutual shaping 
relationship 
Structures 
Signification: HIS officers 
internalize accountability 
 
Reflexivity  
Need for monitoring systems to 
account for medical supplies 
Exhort districts to improve reports 
timeliness and completeness  
Technology domain 
HIS is equipped with 
feedback mechanisms* 
Reflexivity triggers change 
in technology domain* 
Social domain 
Power: donor resources 
and SOPs  
Norms: need to show 
results to get funding 
Structures 
Domination and legitimation: 
performance-based funding 
 
Reflexivity  
Programme manager acknowledges 
the need to improve data management 
 
Technology domain 
EPI-Info and SOPs are 
implemented* 
Reflexivity triggers change 
in technology domain* 
Social domain 
Meaning systems: data 
should inform 
managers’ decisions 
Structures 
Signification: management 
internalizes accountability 
 
Mutual shaping 
relationship 
Mutual shaping 
relationship 
 24 
DHIS2. The Ministry of Health and donor agencies believed that by decentralizing the HIS, 
the use of health information for the management and provision of local health services 
would increase. Thus, after devolution and the creation of counties, DHIS2 changed the way 
health information was collected and managed. New structures of domination emerged, 
which gave county governments control over their own health data to manage health 
services locally. The case study shows how differences in power represented by an unequal 
distribution of resources enabled some counties to benefit from DHIS2 more than others. 
County HIS officers drew upon new norms that legitimized indicators as “being part of 
everyday life” in order to drive the use of health information for decision-making at county 
level. Now that county governments relied on DHIS2 to manage their own health services, 
normative behaviours that legitimized the use of indicators reproduced new structures of 
legitimation through which county HIS officers became fully involved in the work of health 
management teams (HMTs). Devolution and the decentralization of the HIS reduced the 
power distance and facilitated the dialogue between county HIS officers and health 
management teams, who were working “hand-in hand” and, therefore, enacted 
accountability through acts of socialization.  
Other issues emerged in relation to the meaning systems underpinning the adoption 
of DHIS2. First, as one county HIS officer suggested, there were different mindsets about 
the use of health information and not everyone valued the impact of information on health 
service management in the same way. Second, a medical officer made the assumption that 
unlimited data access and improved data consistency that resulted from the use of DHIS2 
triggered the reflexivity of medical officers and other users who became more interested in 
and could better understand health data. Therefore, DHIS2 mediated a socializing form of 
accountability whereby various groups of users, not just HIS officers, learned how data could 
be used to provide evidence about health interventions. 
These findings point to a mutual shaping relationship between the social and 
technology domain. On the one hand, power in the form of availability of resources, together 
with norms and meaning systems that value the use of health information, influenced the 
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extent to which county users effectively engaged with DHIS2 in health service management. 
On the other hand, new norms and meanings that drove the use of DHIS2 can be related to 
the opportunities that the material features of the new system offered. In particular, norms 
and meanings emerging from users’ interactions with DHIS2 contributed to the enactment of 
accountability through acts of socialization. The result is the emergence of a new structure of 
signification representing the internalization of accountability into county managers’ practices 
as reported by some HIS officers. County managers used information to plan and manage 
local health services, which resulted in “democratic accountability”. In contrast to 
“bureaucratic accountability”, “democratic accountability” can increase local decision makers’ 
interests in health information and their ability to value and use data to improve the delivery 
of health services to their citizens (Madon et al., 2010). With bureaucratic accountability, 
actors use information to satisfy the needs of their superiors; with democratic accountability, 
local health authorities and providers are held accountable to the needs of service users 
and, in particular, the poor (Brinkerhoff, 2004). Thus, democratic accountability can 
contribute to development since it helps service providers to understand and act upon the 
challenges that affect the health system in order to provide better healthcare to service 
users. In particular, the case study demonstrates that democratic accountability could be 
achieved through the acts of socialization that DHIS2 facilitated and through which actors 
could collaborate and better understand the needs of the health system.   
The case study also shows that counties were not only using information locally but 
had to comply with structures of domination and legitimation that governed the use of DHIS2 
to account for resources at the national level. Thanks to the new system, national HIS 
officers could customize data reports in DHIS2, access data collected in the counties directly 
on the national server, and use pivot tables to improve data analysis. The importance of 
these data in complying with national and international reporting obligations prompted the 
reflexivity of the national HIS officers that provided counties with quality standards (or 
norms), gaining thus the power to dictate how they should collect and report data. One 
national HIS officer pointed to the lack of confidence in the capacity of some county 
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administrators to understand the meaning of indicators in health sector planning. Lack of 
confidence in the ability of political actors to understand health matters can constitute a 
barrier to dialogue and socializing forms of accountability (Lodenstein et al., 2017), which 
explains why there were no structures of signification that could adequately support the 
enactment of accountability in some of these counties. More specifically, the fact that some 
county administrators were not using information for budgeting demonstrates that 
accountability was not internalized in their practices. It is argued that the lack of structures of 
signification in support of accountability was, in part, the result of the reflexivity of county 
administrators concerning the utility of indicators in addressing the needs of donor agencies 
rather than local health service users. Most of all, because of its flexible design, DHIS2 could 
be customized to satisfy the information needs of the Division of HMIS and other national 
health programmes. As a result, the decentralization of the HIS did not reduce the power 
distance between the national level and the lower levels of the health systems. Counties 
perceived indicators as irrelevant because they were not involved in their design, which is 
another barrier to socialization (Lodenstein et al., 2017) and the enactment of democratic 
accountability. Figure 3 provides a summary of the analysis of the main structuration 
processes after the implementation of DHIS2. 
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Figure 3. The enactment of democratic and bureaucratic accountability with DHIS2 
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analysed in this paper identified two types of accountability: bureaucratic and democratic. 
The discussion that follows provides a greater understanding of how HIS influence the 
enactment of accountability. In particular, it seeks to answer the research questions of this 
paper, first, by unveiling the processes through which accountability acquires legitimacy and 
is enacted locally, second, by demonstrating how the HIS capabilities mediate the 
enactment of accountability. Next, the major implications of this study are discussed. 
The enactment of bureaucratic accountability at the Programme of Immunization 
This section discusses the processes through which actors internalized accountability and 
the role of the HIS in mediating bureaucratic accountability at the Programme of 
Immunization. First, one process through which actors legitimized accountability was the 
alignment of structures of domination (power and resources), legitimation (norms), and 
signification (meaning systems). For example, some officers at the Programme of 
Immunization interpreted accountability as a means to account for results and resources in 
order to better plan activities. The meanings that these officers associated with 
accountability represent structures of signification through which they integrated 
accountability in their practices. Yet, it is not until donor intervention intensified that 
management also internalized accountability but with the intermediation of other structures, 
such as resources and norms that reproduced structures of domination and legitimation. 
Here, accountability acquired different meanings that legitimized new behavioural norms, 
such as “demonstrate results to access funding”.  
Second, actors’ interests played an important role in the way they interpreted and 
internalized accountability, which shows the social nature of accountability (Anifalaje, 2012; 
Topp et al., 2015). For example, HIS officers at the Programme of Immunization developed 
meaning systems that legitimized accountability during a time when the Programme was 
underfunded in order to demonstrate the importance of their role. By contrast, structures of 
domination and legitimation, such as tying funding to performance, spurred management’s 
interest in the use of health information to account for results. 
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Therefore, interests of different groups of actors and social structures should be 
aligned to mediate the enactment of accountability. In particular, the case study shows how 
actors’ socialization can be both a means and outcome of the alignment between social 
structures to achieve common accountability goals. For example, HIS officers at the 
Programme of Immunization engaged in acts of socialization to convince management of the 
value of data to account for the Programme’s performance, whereas management started to 
involve HIS officers in the discussion of accountability objectives only after having 
legitimized accountability.  
By contrast, when the interests and social structures that mediate accountability are 
not aligned, the individualizing effects of bureaucratic accountability are amplified and it is 
therefore difficult to achieve common accountability goals. In particular, the case study found 
that tensions between formal accountability goals of international policies and informal 
accountability goals of national governments and donor agencies can result in an uneven 
support to the HIS and limit dialogue among these stakeholders. For example, whereas the 
Programme of Immunization did not receive much support from the Ministry of Health, donor 
agencies were a major source of funding for its HIS. Yet, conflicting priorities among donor 
agencies, such as accounting for the performance of individual health programmes, 
contradicted the accountability objectives of international (and national) policies. This 
worsened competition over scarce resources and limited “socialization” and the achievement 
of common accountability goals among donor agencies and the Ministry of Health. While 
local actors cope with little institutional support and few resources, they may resort to actions 
that can limit socialization among stakeholders, particularly, across the national and lower 
levels of the health system. For example, HIS officers at the Programme of Immunization 
leveraged their power mainly to exhort districts to report information to the national level 
without putting in place enforcement mechanisms to sanction actors who did not meet 
immunization targets or showing them how data could be used to achieve those targets. An 
example of enforcement mechanisms is GAVI’s performance-based grant that rewarded 
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performance by tying funding to results and mediated the realization of legitimation 
structures through which management internalized bureaucratic accountability. 
Finally, the case of the Programme of Immunization offers a few examples of how 
HIS capabilities can mediate accountability. First, it shows how the meanings attached to 
accountability influenced technological innovation by shaping local actors’ idea of a 
functioning HIS. For example, management’s internalization of bureaucratic accountability 
drove the inscription of rules such as SOPs in the HIS design. These rules enabled the 
decentralization of routines and simple data reporting tasks (Bloom et al., 2014) while 
allowing the central level to enact structures of domination and keep control over the 
information collected. In addition, the HIS mediated the constitution of social relations 
between HIS officers and managers in the Programme of Immunization, which potentially 
could support the local enactment of bureaucratic accountability. Next, the discussion about 
DHIS2 provides further examples about the role of HIS in mediating accountability.  
The role of DHIS2 capabilities in mediating the tension between bureaucratic and 
democratic accountability 
The role of IT materiality in mediating socializing forms of accountability was particularly 
evident in the case of DHIS2 and the enactment of democratic accountability. Like 
bureaucratic accountability, democratic accountability benefitted from the alignment between 
structures of domination (resources at county level), legitimation (e.g., legitimacy of 
monitoring indicators as “part of everyday life”), and signification (belief in the positive impact 
of information on health service management). In particular, democratic accountability was 
possible thanks to devolution and the decentralisation of the HIS, which reduced the power 
distance and increased dialogue among groups of users (e.g., HIS officers and Health 
Management Teams). DHIS2 mediated socialization among different groups of users by 
providing unlimited data access and improving data consistency, which, for example, 
increased medical officers’ interest in health information. Thus, DHIS2 participated in the 
construction of norms and meaning systems (Doolin, 1998, 2003) through which users 
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valued the use of data in health service management and, potentially, could gain a greater 
understanding of the health system’s and patients’ needs.  
In addition to democratic accountability, the digital capabilities of DHIS2 could 
accommodate bureaucratic accountability as well. This was possible thanks to the higher 
interpretive flexibility (Orlikowski, 1992) of the new computerized system compared to the 
previous paper-based system. For example, national HIS officers integrated customized 
reporting forms and quality standards in DHIS2 to dictate how counties should use the 
software to collect and report data. In this way, national HIS officers could use DHIS2 to 
enact bureaucratic accountability in order to account for health sector performance at the 
national level.  
Bureaucratic accountability and democratic accountability have different objectives. 
Whereas the former is about accounting for performance against set targets, the latter aims 
to account for the needs of health service users (Brinkerhoff 2004). Yet, the case study 
shows that these objectives should not be in conflict but complement each other. Indeed, 
dialogue and socialization across the national and lower levels of the health system can 
ensure that bureaucratic accountability does not hamper democratic accountability. 
For example, the case study showed a misalignment between structures of 
domination/legitimation and structures of signification. Whereas the former sustained 
bureaucratic accountability at the national level, the latter represented county administrators’ 
view of these indicators as serving the needs of donor agencies rather than the health care 
needs of their communities. One of the possible causes of this misalignment was national 
HIS officers’ lack of confidence in county administrators’ understanding of data to the extent 
that dialogue between these groups of actors may have been difficult. In addition, the new 
features of DHIS2 mediated the tension between bureaucratic and democratic accountability 
by maintaining the power distance between national and county users of the HIS. The 
consequent lack of socialization between these two groups of users and, in particular, the 
lack of involvement of county users in the design of monitoring indicators may have 
jeopardized democratic accountability. Together with the example of enforcement 
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mechanisms in the Programme of Immunization, these findings stress the importance of a 
two-way communication system and the presence of both answerability and enforcement 
mechanisms (Brinkerhoff, 2004) across the national and lower levels of the health system to 
ensure that information is used to improve the health service. 
Implications for the integration of IT materiality within structuration theory  
The first implication of this paper concerns the integration of materiality in a structuration 
theory perspective. The paper demonstrates how structuration theory is still a useful 
perspective for studying the linkage between IT materiality and socio-organizational 
processes and, in particular, for understanding how IS mediate legitimation, power, and 
meaning structures. One of the assumptions of structuration theory is that actors hold 
themselves accountable by reflexively monitoring their own and other people’s actions to 
make sure that they conform to socially acceptable behaviours. By focusing on the different 
modalities through which HIS users reproduced structures of domination, legitimation, and 
signification, this study was able to identify different assumptions by which users interpreted 
and legitimized accountability. For example, one county officer mentioned how much he 
valued the use of health information in health service management. Such a view of 
information can influence the use of HIS to account for health service users’ needs in 
contrast with national HIS officers’ use of the HIS to account for health sector performance. 
Yet, one criticism of Giddens’ structuration theory is that it overlooks how the 
enduring materiality of IT may affect social structures (Jones & Karsten, 2008). This study 
addresses this limitation by using Sewell’s conceptualization of “allocative resources” as 
material (Sewell, 1992, 2005) and argues that, in addition to virtual structures, the material 
features of IT are also implicated in processes of structuration. In particular, this study 
adopts the notion of interpretive flexibility (Doherty et al., 2006) to show how the material 
features of a technology can act as the boundaries within which users can interpret a 
technology while they draw on the social structures of their institutional environment. Under 
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this perspective, materiality is implicated in processes of structuration by influencing the 
meanings that users associate with a technology and users’ intended use of a technology. 
Sociomateriality and the structuration theory perspective developed in this paper are 
different and can be used to study different aspects of accountability. For example, the focus 
on sociomaterial practices as a “constitutive entanglement” (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008) can 
be used to understand how sociomaterial practices, such as “anonymity”, blur the 
boundaries between users’ identities and their material-discursive interactions on social 
media, which challenges transparency and accountability (S. V. Scott & Orlikowski, 2014). 
The focus of this paper is on a different aspect of accountability, that is, how IT materiality, 
and, more specifically, HIS capabilities mediate the enactment and legitimacy of 
accountability. Answers to this question require a different lens that, as opposed to 
sociomateriality, does not conflate the material with the social, but considers them as two 
discrete entities. The critical realist version of sociomateriality (Leonardi, 2013; Mutch, 2013) 
and its view of the material and social as two distinct entities could serve this purpose if it 
were not for its lack of conceptualization of social structures. Through the notion of 
“interpretive flexibility”, the case study shows how the material features of the HIS shape the 
rules, norms and meanings implicated in the reproduction of social structures that legitimize 
accountability. For example, DHIS2 mediated the construction of norms and meaning 
systems (Doolin, 1998, 2003) through which users could gain a greater understanding of the 
value of data in health service management locally. Therefore, the enduring part of an IT, in 
this case the capabilities of DHIS2, were implicated in processes of structuration that 
supported a decentralized use of health information and the consequent enactment of 
democratic accountability.  
Implications for understanding the role of ICT in fostering development 
A second implication of this study concerns the role of flexible web-based technologies in 
making a difference for development (e.g., Jha, Pinsonneault, & Dubé, 2016; Monteiro & 
Hanseth, 1996). In particular, this study contributes towards a greater understanding of how 
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HIS, with a flexible IT design, can foster development by facilitating democratic 
accountability, i.e., by increasing local decision makers’ interests in health information and 
their ability of valuing and using data to improve the delivery of health services to their 
citizens. Evidence regarding the use of DHIS2 in the counties demonstrates how the 
materiality of flexible IT participates in the construction of norms and meaning systems 
through which users value the use of data. By doing so, flexible IT mediates the socialization 
among different groups of HIS users, who, potentially, can gain a greater understanding of 
the challenges of the health system and account for health service users’ needs. 
This study also contributes to the debate about the role of devolution and 
decentralized HIS in fostering development (Madon et al., 2010). In particular, it shows how 
the flexible design of a decentralized HIS can lead to the co-existence of both bureaucratic 
and democratic accountabilities adding to the complexity of the impact of HIS on health 
service management. While previous research has stressed the need to balance between 
centrally controlled and decentralized health care information infrastructures (Rodon & Silva, 
2015), the case study illustrated in this paper demonstrates the conflicts that may arise if 
such a balance is not achieved. In particular, the case of DHIS2 shows how flexible HIS can 
be re-adapted to serve the interests and information needs of actors at the central level and 
reproduce structures of domination that favour bureaucratic accountability. These structures 
might limit the socialization among actors of the health system, which can put democratic 
accountability at risk and undermine a better use of information to address the health care 
and development needs of local communities. These findings highlight the complexity of 
LMICs’ contexts for being characterized by power, legitimacy, and meaning structures that 
are often misaligned and reflect competing accountability goals. Ideally, ICT can foster 
development by mediating and rebalancing the tension between conflicting social structures 
and accountabilities. In particular, HIS should be designed in a way that can foster dialogue 
and socialization across the different levels of the health system so that the goals of 
bureaucratic and democratic accountabilities are not in conflict but complement each other.  
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Earlier studies suggest that the use of HIS to promote bureaucratic accountability 
through the monitoring of national health targets and funding can have controversial effects 
for development (Ciborra, 2005; Noir & Walsham, 2007). Research attributes such 
controversial effects to the political nature of ICT4D programmes, particularly when they are 
meant to “enforce” values that are alien to local contexts (Andrade & Urquhart, 2012; Sahay, 
Monteiro, & Aanestad, 2009; Walsham & Sahay, 1999). Through the analysis of 
bureaucratic accountability in the Programme of Immunization, this study adds to this 
research by showing how the negative development impact of HIS is due to the 
individualizing effects of bureaucratic accountability (Roberts, 1991) that the tension 
between formal policy objectives and multiple agencies in LMICs amplify. The challenge for 
ICT in fostering development is to balance these different agencies, in particular, because of 
the social nature of accountability whereby interests mediate accountability goals. While the 
focus of this study was mainly on bureaucratic and democratic accountability in the health 
sector, there are also social accountabilities that can elude the development impact of ICT 
(Miscione 2007). Social accountabilities often relate to practices of social protection that hold 
individuals accountable to their community but that can have negative effects on public 
health. An example is “widow inheritance” whereby the widow of a man who may have died 
of AIDS can be inherited by a family or clan member increasing the risk of contagion (Okeyo 
& Allen, 1994). Further research could investigate how ICT-based mobilization programmes 
can improve healthcare and development outcomes by mediating the goals and effects of 
social accountabilities. 
Implications for IS and accountability 
Recent IS research has mainly focused on the role of IS in holding people accountable and 
self-disciplined by making their behaviour more visible (Constantinides, 2011; Doolin, 1998; 
Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, 2013). This bureaucratic view of accountability as reinforcing norms 
of control is contrasted with a socializing form of accountability (Roberts, 1991) where actors 
socially construct accountability in relation to their interests (Anifalaje, 2012) and enact 
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accountability through social acts and learning encounters (Madon & Krishna, 2017). The IS 
literature has overlooked such a socializing form of accountability and has mainly focused on 
the individualizing effects of accountability. This study fills this gap by showing how IS can 
mediate the socializing effects of accountability.   
As shown in the case study, there can be different interpretations of accountability. 
For example, in the context of healthcare some actors may interpret accountability as a way 
to account for resources and performance, others may interpret it as a way to account for 
patients’ needs. IS contributes to the construction of social relations among actors and 
mediates the norms and meaning systems through which users understand what 
accountability involves, and share and negotiate accountability goals. 
This study also found that the interests of different groups of actors, such as HIS 
officers and managers in the Programme of Immunization, influence the enactment of 
accountability. Thus, a system design meant to enhance the perception of accountability 
(Vance et al., 2013) may work for some users but not for others. By showing how IS can 
mediate the interests and meanings actors associate with accountability, this study 
contributes to a greater understanding of how IS can rebalance multiple organizational and 
professional accountabilities (Yekel, 2001). A closer look at how IS mediate the social 
construction of accountability can explain, for example, why some health care professionals 
are likely to accept the use of IS to monitor their performance more than others (Doolin, 
2004; Gabe, Exworthy, Jones, & Smith, 2012; Wainwright & Waring, 2007). 
Another implication of this study concerns the role of IS as an “answerability 
mechanism” (Brinkerhoff, 2004) that supplies information about employees’ performance 
and, thereby, contributes to making employees’ work more visible and subject to 
management’s control (Roberts, 1991). The case study suggests that the use of IS as 
answerability mechanisms might contribute to distorted representations of performance 
(Vieira da Cunha et al., 2015). Future research should investigate how enforcement and 
feedback mechanisms could be better integrated in the use of IS in order to ensure that 
information is actually used to improve performance. Performance management could be 
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more effective if organizations used IS as a means of socialization and learning (V. E. Scott, 
2015) to enact “accountability for improvement” instead of “accountability for control” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2004).   
Conclusion 
This study draws on structuration theory to understand how accountability acquires 
legitimacy and becomes enacted locally. The case study analysed in this paper reveals the 
role of social structures, such as norms, meaning systems, and resources, in mediating 
users’ interpretation and legitimation of accountability. Through this process of legitimation, 
local actors attach meanings to accountability, which, in turn, influence their representation 
of how the HIS should be designed and used. An important implication of the findings 
illustrated in this paper concerns the role of materiality in processes of structuration and, in 
particular, how HIS capabilities mediate the enactment of accountability. In addition, this 
study considers HIS not just as a means for controlling performance but also as a means of 
socialization through which health care authorities and providers can account for the needs 
of health service users. This study acknowledges the complexity of HIS characterised by 
centralized and decentralized forms of governance (Rodon & Silva, 2015) and the challenge 
for HIS to mediate among competing accountability goals.  
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